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To foster the participation of Aboriginal peoples in resource governance, the Government of Canada has
recently restructured a number of administrative regimes, converting them into institutions of comanagement. Despite this restructuring, the degree to which Aboriginal peoples’ participation can influence
the regulatory output of co-management boards remains uncertain in law. This article deconstructs one
interpretive method that can impact participation in co-management regimes: harmonization. Drawing on a
trilogy of cases, I argue that recent judicial efforts to harmonize the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management
Act with its predecessor, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, can limit the regional interpretive
differences that Aboriginal peoples’ participation in treaties and co-management is intended to foster. This
outcome is problematic to the extent that it frustrates the participatory goals of the legislation and the
substantive goals of contemporary treaties. In light of this problem, I advocate a cautious approach to
statutory interpretation in which administrative boards tasked with ensuring Aboriginal participation in
decision making can be expected to produce rules, decisions, and interpretations that differ from those
produced under other regimes.
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Living in Perfect Harmony: Harmonizing
Sub-Arctic Co-Management through
Judicial Review
SARI GRABEN*
To foster the participation of Aboriginal peoples in resource governance, the Government
of Canada has recently restructured a number of administrative regimes, converting them
into institutions of co-management. Despite this restructuring, the degree to which Aboriginal
peoples' participation can influence the regulatory output of co-management boards
remains uncertain in law. This article deconstructs one interpretive method that can impact
participation in co-management regimes: harmonization. Drawing on a trilogy of cases, I argue
that recent judicial efforts to harmonize the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act with its
predecessor, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, can limit the regional interpretive
differences that Aboriginal peoples' participation in treaties and co-management is intended
to foster. This outcome is problematic to the extent that it frustrates the participatory goals of the
legislation and the substantive goals of contemporary treaties. In light of this problem, I
advocate a cautious approach to statutory interpretation in which administrative boards tasked
with ensuring Aboriginal participation in decision making can be expected to produce rules,
decisions, and interpretations that differ from those produced under other regimes.
Dans le but de favoriser la participation des Autochtones 6 ta gouvernance des ressources,
le gouvernement du Canada a r6cemment restructur6 un certain nombre de r6gimes administratifs en Les convertissant en institutions de cogestion. Ma!gr6 cette restructuration, le
degr6 auquel La participation des Autochtones peut influencer [a production r6g[ementaire
des conseiLs de cogestion demeure incertain en droit. Cet article d~construit une m~thode
interpr6tative qui peut avoir une incidence sur [a participation 6 des r6gimes de cogestion,
soit Iharmonisation. Minspirant d'une trilogie de cas, je plaide que les rcents efforts judiciaires en vue d'harmoniser LaLoi sur [a gestion des ressources de Lavall~e du Mackenzie
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especially like to thank Dr. Brian Slattery for his comments and critiques on the arguments
contained here. I also thank the anonymous reviewers and staff of the Osgoode Hall Law
Journal for their excellent comments and assistance and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council for the funding that supported tis research.
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avec son pr~d~cesseur, [a Loi canadienne sur '6vatuation environnementae, peut imiter
Les 6carts d'interpr~tation rkgiona!e que La participation des Autochtones 6 des trait6s et 6
ta cogestion vise a favoriser. Ce r~sultat est probt6matique dans ta mesure o6 it contrecarre
tes objectifs participatifs de [a t6gislation et Les objectifs substantifs des trait~s contemporains. A [a tumi~re de ce prob[.me, je mitite en faveur d'une approche prudente envers une
interpr6tation des Lois en vertu de taquette Les conseits d'administration qui se voient confier
ta mission de s'assurer de ta participation des Autochtones ta prise de d6cision devraient
produire des r~gtes, d~cisions et interpretations qui diff6rent de cettes qui sont 61abor~es en
vertu d'autres rkgimes.
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IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR COURTS to use the language and meaning of the Canadian EnvironmentalAssessment Act (CEAA) 1 to interpret a statute that expressly
precludes the CEAA's application? Statutes that stem from contemporary
Aboriginal treaties and purport to establish new administrative regimes have
made this question particularly significant because they engage issues of participation in co-management. These new administrative regimes, known as
co-management boards, have been tasked with governing resource use in parts of
British Columbia, Quebec, Labrador, Nunavut, the Yukon, and the Northwest
Territories. In this article, I analyze three cases from the Northwest Territories in
which courts used the text of the CEAA to interpret the statute that establishes
co-management in the Mackenzie Valley-the Mackenzie Valley Resource
ManagementAct.2 Through these cases, I analyze the impact of harmonization as
an interpretive methodology on the participatory goals of co-management regimes.

1.
2.

SC 1992, c 37 [CEAA].
SC 1998, c 25 [MVRMA]. The three cases are North American Tungsten Corp Ltd v Mackenzie
Valley Land and Water Board(2002), 118 ACWS (3d) 897 (NWTSC) [Tungsten SC], rev'd
(2003), 125 ACWS (3d) 516 (NWTCA) [Tungsten CA] [collectively, Tungsten]; Canadian
Zinc Corp v Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (2005), 139 ACWS (3d) 411 (NWTSC)
[CanadianZinc]; De Beers Canada Inc v Mackenzie Valley EnvironmentalImpact Review Board
(2007), 156 ACWS (3d) 378 (NWTSC) [De Beers].
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The role of co-management boards in the Mackenzie Valley is to license
most undertakings related to the use of land, water, and wildlife in their
respective regions or to make recommendations related to environmental
impacts. However, because they have been established pursuant to contemporary
land claims agreements, the boards and their enabling statutes also reflect
Aboriginal peoples' goal of participating in resource governance by engaging
in shared decision making.3 Co-management is intended to instantiate accountability to Aboriginal peoples and the general public by linking decision making
to independent boards comprised of members nominated by Aboriginal, federal,
territorial, or provincial governments.
In the Mackenzie Valley, co-management is one of a series of institutional
structures aimed at addressing the historical absence of the Sahtu,' Gwich'in,5
and Tlicho6 First Nations from governmental resource management decisions.
Co-management is also a response to the federal government's past attempts
to license development without the participation of these groups. 7 To address
these problems, the MVRAL authorizes the establishment of an environmental
assessment board for the region, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact
Review Board (Review Board). The MVRMA also establishes explicit assessment
procedures that implement the treaty provisions and, with some limited exceptions,
expressly precludes the application of the CEAA. Taken together, these changes
reflect an intention to fulfill the terms of the treaties and implement a distinct
environmental assessment regime in the Mackenzie Valley.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

For different permutations, see Stephen R Tyler, Co-management of NaturalResources: Local
LearningFor Poverty Reduction (Ottawa: IDRC, 2006); Gerett Rusnak, "Co-Management
of Natural Resources in Canada: A Review of Concepts and Case Studies" Working Paper 1,
Rural Poverty and the Environment Working Paper Series (Ottawa: IDRC, 1997), online:
<http://web.idrc.caluploadsluser-S/ 10219953490rusnak.pdf>; Donna Craig, "Recognizing
Indigenous Rights through Co-Management Regimes: Canadian and Australian Experiences"
(2002) 6 NZJ Envt'l L 199.
Gwich'in Comprehensive Land ClaimAgreement (1992), online: <http://www.gwichin.nt.ca/
documents/GCLCA.pdf> [Gwich'in Land Claim Agreement].
Sahtu Dene andMetis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (1993), online:
<http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/
sahmet1 100100031148-eng.pdf> [Sahtu Land Claim Agreement].
Tlicho Land Claims andSelf-Government Agreement (2003), online: <http://mvlwb.com/
files/2011/07/Tlicho-Agreement.pdf> [ Tlicho Land ClaimAgreement].
For greater insight into federal government decision making in the north prior to
contemporary treaties, see Thomas Berger, Northern Frontier,Northern Homeland The Report
Of The Mackenzie Valley PipelineInquiry (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988).
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For example, the M ?VRMA implements treaty terms that subject development
in the Mackenzie Valley to its detailed assessment processes. These terms
establish a stand-alone environmental impact assessment process for lands
covered by the agreements. This environmental impact assessment process
itemizes the roles, responsibilities, and jurisdiction of the boards, Aboriginal
governments, territorial governments, and the federal government in exacting detail. The intention to subject development in the Mackenzie Valley to
a distinct environmental assessment regime is also evidenced by the treaties.
Thus, the Sahtu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement states,
"All development proposals in the Mackenzie Valley, including development
proposals in relation to Sahtu lands, shall be subject to the process of environmental impact assessment and review as set out in 25.3."8 Similarly, the Tlicho
Land Claim Agreement states, in part, "The process of environmental impact
assessment and review as set out in 22.2 applies to every proposed project that
is wholly or partly in the Mackenzie Valley...."'
Article 25.3 of the Sahtu Dene andMetis Comprehensive Land ClaimAgreement, article 22.2 of the Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement,
and article 24.3 of the Gwich'in Land Claim Agreement define an assessment
process analogous to that found in the CEAA. 1° However, the articles use
language and processes that reflect an agreement to depart from the CEAA's
approach to environmental assessment. For example, both the MVRMA and
the Tlicho Land Claims and Self Government Agreement employ a use of the
term "environment" that includes the social and cultural environment. 1" This
definition is markedly dissimilar to that of the CEAA."2 As would be expected
of any statute, differences in statutory language have led to distinct interpretations of the respective boards' mandates and jurisdictions. As a result of the
distinct definition of "impact on the environment" in the MVRMA, the Review Board considers direct and indirect impacts on heritage resources or the
social and cultural environment, independent of changes to the biophysical

8. Supra note 5, art 25.3.1.
9. Supra note 6, art 22.2.1.
10. For elaboration on similarities see Part III(A), below.
11. Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, supra note 6, art 1.1.1 ("environment"); MIVMRA, supra note
2, s Il1 ("impact on the environment").
12.

The definition of "environment" in the Tlicho Land C/aim Agreement and "impact on the
environment" in the MVRMA should be contrasted against the corresponding definition of
"environmental effect" in the CEAA. CEAA, supra note 1, s 2(1).

GRABEN. LIVING IN PERFECT HARMONY

203

environment. 3 This approach can be contrasted with that of the CEAA, which
limits assessment of effects on socio-economic factors, on heritage, and on Aboriginal resource use to those that come about as consequences of changes to the
physical environment.1
In addition to implementing processes that formalize authority to govern
assessment in the region, the MVRMA declares its intention to preclude other
assessment regimes in section 116, which states that barring limited exceptions
discussed below, the CEAA does not apply in the Mackenzie Valley in respect of
proposals for development." This preclusion of the CEAA from the Mackenzie
Valley is not a mere administrative side effect of the MVRMA coming into force.
In the Mackenzie Valley, the legal framework for environmental assessment has
changed dramatically over the last twenty years because of contemporary land
claims. Prior to the M RAIA, almost all land and water use in the Northwest
Territories was regulated pursuant to federal legislation by a territorial or federal
body. 6 The CEAA and its predecessor, the EnvironmentalAssessment and Review
Process Guidelines,7 governed environmental assessment and were criticized as
tools for centralized decision making. The main criticism was that federal
assessment permitted non-local and non-Aboriginal persons to determine how developments would affect lands claimed by Aboriginal peoples. The
terms of the treaties on which the MVRMA is based were negotiated in light of
this criticism and with the expectation that a new administrative regime would
decentralize decision making and account for local perspectives through First
Nations participation. 8
13.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.

Mary Tapsell & Alistair MacDonald, "The 'awakening' of SEIA in the Northwest Territories,
Canada--he Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board's Experience"
(Paper delivered at the 27th Annual Meeting of the International Association for Impact
Assessment, Seoul, 3-9 June 2007), online:
<http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/refjlibrary/s%20 Experience_ 186093586.pdf>.
Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, A Reference Guidefor the Canadian
EnvironmentalAssessment Act: DeterminingWhether A Project is Likely to Cause Significant
Adverse EnvironmentalEffects (Ottawa: Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office,
1994), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/D213D286-2512-47F4-B9C3-08B5C0IE5005/
Determining-Whether-a Project-isLikely-to Cause-SignificantAdverse-EnvironmentalEffects.pdf>.
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 116.
For example, the Northwest Territories Water Board granted licences permitting the use of
water and the deposit of waste under the Northwest TerritoriesWaters Act, SC 1992, c 39
[Waters Act].
EnvironmentalAssessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84-467.
Graham White, Vern Christensen & Alan Ehrlich, "Involving Canada's Indigenous Peoples
in Environmental Impact Assessment: Co-management through the Mackenzie Valley
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Lastly, section 116 of the MVRMA sets out the exact and limited condition in which the CEAA may apply to the Mackenzie Valley: where a proposal
is subject to joint federal-territorial environmental reviews. 19 Should the
Minister of the Environment and the Review Board be unable to come to
an agreement on the establishment of a joint review panel, a review panel
shall still be convened in the Mackenzie Valley, pursuant to the CEAA.25
However, it is noteworthy that the application of the CEAA does not bar the
Review Board's continuing jurisdiction to conduct an environmental impact
assessment pursuant to the MVRMA. 1 In fact, the CEAA mandates that even
if a panel review is ordered, it is to be coordinated with the MVRMA environmental impact assessment. 2 Moreover, the Minister is to consider the
MVRMA environmental impact assessment report and consult with persons
or bodies to whom the report is distributed prior to taking action.23
The provisions establishing an assessment regime under the MVRMA
are intended to create a regime that acts in place of the CEAA and other
environmental assessment processes. More precisely, this regime reflects the
understanding reached in contemporary treaties that a separate and distinct
legal regime will govern environmental assessment in the Mackenzie Valley.
The reason why this type of provision is consistent among the various treaties in the Mackenzie Valley is straightforward: Environmental assessment
has become one of the key processes for analyzing, permitting, or preventing
development. Contemporary treaties therefore create new regulatory regimes
in which decision-making processes reflect Aboriginal participation so that

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Environmental Impact Review Board" (Paper delivered at the 2 7 h Annual Conference of
the International Association for Impact Assessment, Seoul, 3-9 June 2007), online: <http://
reviewboard.ca/upload/reflibrary/IAIA%20paper%20re%2OCo-mgmt%20through%20
the%20MVEIRB;%2OSeoul%2OKorea%20June%202007%20_ 182980894.pdf>.
In accordance with the MVRMA, joint reviews can arise by one of two methods. The first
method is where a joint review is deemed to be in the national interest of the country. In
this circumstance, section 130(1)(c) of the MVRMA permits the Minister of Aboriginal and
Northern Affairs to refer a proposal to the Minister of the Environment, who is required to
refer the matter to a joint review panel pursuant to the CEAA. CEAA, supra note 1, s 28(2);
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 130(l)(c). Similarly, where there is a trans-regional development,
the Review Board may enter into an agreement with the Minister of the Environment to
provide for joint review panel in the area where the CEAIA would apply. MVRMA, supra note
2, s 141(2)(a).
CEAA, supra note 1, s 40(2.2).
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 141(4).
CEAA, supra note 1, s 40(2.3).
Ibid,s40(2.4).
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these groups can influence resource development." In the Mackenzie Valley,
this objective is enacted through the MVRMA.
In light of the political and legal history behind the MVRMA, what was
the basis for recent decisions about the relevance of the CEAA to the interpretation of the MVRMA? I argue that the legal basis for the CEAA's application or
non-application rests on how courts interpret parliamentary intent with respect
to the meaning and effect of the two statutes. The critical question that guided
the interpretation and application of the MVRAA in these cases was whether
Parliament intended the MVRAL4 to be harmonized (interpreted in accordance)
with the CEAA. Where the courts found an intention to harmonize the two statutes, the CEAA was deemed relevant to interpretation. Where the courts found
an intention to differentiate these pieces of legislation, the CEAA was deemed
irrelevant to interpretation. However, where the courts found an intention to
harmonize the statutes, they imported the pre-established meaning of the CEAA
into the MVRMA, thereby preventing it from developing as a distinct regime.
This importation is problematic in so far as it limits differences in statutory
language and interpretation that are central to the purpose and object of the treaties
on which the MVRMA is based.
Harmonization is a process that results in progressively greater levels of uniformity between laws or legal systems.2" Where harmonization relates to making
See Quebec (AG) vMoses, [2010] 1 SCR 557 [Moses]. Surprisingly, the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada did not interpret the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement
as vesting these same rights in the Cree. Article 22.2.1 of that agreement states that "[t]he
environmental and social protection regime applicable in the Territory shall be established
by and in accordance with the provisions of this Section." James Bay andNorthern Quebec
Agreement (1975), online: <http://www.gcc.ca/pdf/LEGOOOOOOO06.pdf> [BNQA]. The
Court interpreted article 22.7.5 as conferring a right on the federal government to conduct
CEAA assessment as "external" to the treaty (Moses, ibidat para 11). Article 22.7.5 states that:
[n]othing in the present Section shall be construed as imposing an impact assessment review
procedure by the Federal Government unless required by Federal law or regulation. However,
this shall not operate to preclude Federal requirement for an additional Federal impact review
process as a condition of Federal funding of any development project.
Whether constitutional law, including treaties, permits processes that are both internal and
external to theJBNQA is a matter for future deliberation. Regardless, its holding is unlikely
to be of application to the Mackenzie Valley treaties. Unlike the JBNQA, the treaties of the
Mackenzie Valley purport to deal with assessment in its entirety insofar as they establish the
roles and responsibilities of the boards, Aboriginal governments, territorial governments, and
the federal government in exacting detail and insofar as they do not contemplate the precise
conditions under which another assessment regime, such as the CEAA, may apply.
25. H Patrick Glenn, "Harmony of Laws in the Americas" (2003) 34 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev
223 at 246.
24.
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domestic laws more alike, debates as to its value usually revolve around issues of
efficacy and efficiency. However, where harmonization relates to the importation
of laws into distinct legal systems or the adoption of laws that conflict with
cultural norms, it also raises debates about legal and political objectives. In
essence, harmonization and the idea of using a common core of legal standards
reflect the assumption that law may be separated analytically from the social,
political, and economic context in which it operates.26 Scholars and practitioners
who research this subject have identified a number of problems with this assumption, one of them being that harmonization can preclude laws that reflect distinct
values of a particular region or culture.2"
I examine the use of harmonization as an interpretive technique because it
raises questions about the role of the court in effecting the participatory goals of
contemporary treaties more generally. It is clear that co-management's goals are
to be achieved through the formal legal arrangements that create a framework for
participation.28 However, it remains unclear in what way Parliament intended
Aboriginal participation to impact the substance of resource management. The
trilogy of cases canvassed here is important because through harmonization, the
judges grapple with why the federal government enacted distinct legislation in
the Mackenzie Valley, whether it intended that legislation to have a different
effect from its predecessor, and who will determine that difference.
There are.many unresolved questions in Canadian law about the practical and
theoretical nature of co-management and the way it accounts for the participation
26. For an example of this kind of approach to law, see Alan Watson, Legal Transplants:An
Approach to ComparativeLaw (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1974). Watson
asserts that law is like a technical invention, such as the wheel. Compare this against 0
Kahn-Freund, "On the Use and Misuses of Comparative Law" (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 1.
For discussion, see William Ewald, "Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants" (1995) 43 Am J Comp L 489.
27. See e.g. Katharina Pistor, "The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Nations"
(2002) 50 Am J Comp L 97 at 98. Pistor argues that harmonization may undermine
the development of effective legal systems because it ignores two of their characteristics:
interdependence of law, and law as a cognitive institution. See also Daniel Berkowitz,
Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, "Relationships Between Development, Legality
and Transplants" 47 (2003) Eur Econ Rev 165 at 173-175; Nehal Bhuta, "Against StateBuilding" (2008) 15 Constellations: Int'l J Critical & Democratic Theory 517.
28. Co-management can be sourced to political organization for greater autonomy, and the
power to nominate members to a co-management board remains with the Aboriginal
government. However, it would not be accurate to characterize the powers of an institution
of public government as an exercise of Aboriginal autonomy. The term "autonomy" best
references provisions that confer legislative and executive authority on an Aboriginal
government.
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of Aboriginal peoples. A number of decisions in the Mackenzie Valley and other
treaty jurisdictions have dealt with Aboriginal peoples' right to participate in
decision making. For example, courts have begun to contemplate what political
or social role Aboriginal government nominees play on co-management boards29
and what impact such representation may have on other areas of law, such as the
duty to consult.3" Courts have also begun to debate approaches to contemporary
treaty interpretation and to consider how best to reflect the negotiations that led
up to the signing of the treaties. 1 In addition, courts are increasingly called upon
to deal with disputes between co-management boards and the governments that
have nominees on those boards.32
The legal issues, statutory provisions, and treaties in many of these cases
differ and are not easily compared. However, these cases reflect collectively an
attempt to grapple with the practicalities of implementing new administrative regimes premised on Aboriginal participation. They also reflect an effort to
uphold the constitutional objective of contemporary treaties: the reconciliation
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.33 In essence, as the administrative state is increasingly required to consider treaty rights, courts must find ways to
review decisions in a manner that accounts for rights and treaties more generally. 34
See e.g. Ka'a'GeeTu FirstNation v Canada(Minister of Indian andNorthern Affairs), [2008]
2 FCR 473 at paras 43-47 (FC) [Ka'a'Gee]; Dene Tha'FirstNation v Canada (Ministerof
Environment) (2006), 303 FTR 106 at paras 65-67 [Dene 7hal; DeBeers, supra note 2 at para 20.
30. Beckman v Little Salmon/CarmacksFirst Nation, [2010] 3 SCR 103 [Beckman]; Dene Tha',
ibid; Yellowknives Dene First Nation v Canada (Attorney General)(2010), 377 FTR 267;
Nunavut Wildlife ManagementBoard v Canada (MinisterofFisheriesand Oceans), [2009]
4 FCR 544 (FC); QikiqtaniInui Assn v Canada (MinisterofIndian Affairs and Northern
Development) (1998), 155 FTR 161.
31. Moses, supra note 24; Western Copper Corp v Yukon Water Board (2011), 57 CELR (3d) 193
(YKSC). For a discussion of emerging judicial attitudes to contemporary treaties, see Dwight
Newman, "Contractual and Covenantal Conceptions of Modern Treaty Interpretation"
(2011) 54 SCLR (2d) 475.
32. Tlicho v Mackenzie Valley Impact Review Board,[2011] AWLD 3309 (NWTSC) [Tlicho];
Qikiqtani Inuit Assn v Canada (Ministerof NaturalResources), [2010] 4 CNLR 190 (NUCJ).
33. Beckman, supra note 30 at para 10.
34. Questions about implementing rights are just beginning to take root in the scholarship
and have mostly focussed on the duty to consult, one aspect of treaty participation. See
e.g. Dwight G Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationshipswith AboriginalPeoples
(Saskatoon: Purich, 2009). However, scholars have begun to theorize interpretive principles
that assist an inquiry into how the common law can account for participation in treaty
regimes. For comments on generative rights that grow and change, see Brian Slattery, "The
Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Ct L Rev (2d) 595. For
an argument on the need to displace law and policy that conflict with rights, see James
[Sa'ke'j] Youngblood Henderson, "Dialogical Governance: A Mechanism of Constitutional
29.
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These cases therefore raise a host of questions about how co-management treaty
rights are to be interpreted to account for participation and for the values and
perspectives that arise from such participation.
In this article, I consider one of the many questions raised by co-management:
Does an interpretive method that harmonizes the language of a new statute in
accordance with its predecessor undermine the objective of Aboriginal participation entrenched in contemporary treaties? In order to answer this question,
I analyze three cases from the Northwest Territories that used the CEAA to
interpret the MVRMA. While there are an increasing number of contemporary
treaty cases that engage the CEAA, 35 I draw on these three cases and the region
of the Mackenzie Valley in particular because, to date, they alone explicitly use
the CEAA to interpret a statute enacted pursuant to a contemporary treaty.
Through these cases, I decoftstruct one particular method by which courts assess
the relevance of Aboriginal peoples' participation to statutory interpretation. I
also consider the effect of this assessment on contemporary treaty regimes more
generally. 6 These insights will be relevant to future applications of the CEAA and
to the categorization of interpretive methodologies within participatory regimes.
In an attempt to unpack the role of participation in statutory interpretation,
Part I of this article introduces the objectives of the MVRMA. Linking participation with the goals of power sharing and better resource management, I argue
that Parliament intended the MVRMA to promote participation as a technique
to achieve these aims. This reading of the MVRMA is derived from the language
of the statute and treaties and from their roots in the political movement for selfgovernment and resource management. Part II considers the three cases where
the courts have considered harmonizing the meaning of the MVRMA with that
of the CEAA. In two of the cases, the courts found the meaning of the CEAA to
be determinative. The court in the third case expressly rejected this approach. In
Part III, I reflect upon the use of harmonization in these cases and the participatory
Governance" (2009) 72 Sask L Rev 29. For a discussion of the need to place communities
at the centre of debates to illuminate knowledge and allow for effective representation, see
John Borrows, Recovering Canada: the Resurgence ofIndigenous Law (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002) at 43.
35. See generally supra notes 29-32. See also Moses, supra note 24, where the Court interpreted
the treaty as permitting the operation of the CEAA as separate from the treaty. However,
no decisions have explicitly drawn on the CEAA to interpret the meaning and intent of the
statute in question or the original agreement.
36. I note that while there are commonalities among contemporary treaties, each treaty
jurisdiction employs distinct language to address further assessment. Furthermore, recent
judicial direction to rely on the text in interpretation warrants caution in making broad
comparisons without accounting for their differences. See Moses, supra note 24 at para 6.
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goals of the treaties. I caution against harmonization where it fails to account
for differences in statutory interpretation. Further, I argue that harmonization
is problematic where it disconnects procedural requirements for participation in
the MVRAIA from its corresponding substantive objective of creating a distinct
regulatory and assessment regime premised on participation.

I. THE PARTICIPATORY OBJECTIVES OF THE MVRMA
Upon coming into force in 1998, the MVRMA established a number of resource
management boards tasked with regulating resource development in the Mackenzie Valley. With some exceptions, the MVRMA's jurisdiction applies to the
Northwest Territories and includes five regions governed by the Gwich'in, Sahtu,
Deh Cho, Akaitcho, and Tlicho peoples. Its stated purpose is to provide for an
integrated system of land and water management in the Mackenzie Valley and
to establish certain boards for that purpose." As such, the MVRA
vests these
regulatory boards with permitting authority over land and water in the settlement areas.
The MVRMA is set out in seven parts. Part 1 sets out general provisions
respecting all of the boards within its purview. Parts 2-5 establish particular
boards related to land use planning, land and water regulation, and environmental impact review. Part 6 establishes environmental monitoring and audit
requirements, and Part 7 deals with implementation and amendment. The effect
of the MVRMA is to establish a land use planning board and a land and water
board for each of the three settlement areas. For overlapping jurisdictional issues,
it establishes the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board; for environmental
impact assessment, it charges the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact
Review Board (the Review Board) with responsibility. In short, any development that requires the use of land or water must go through at least one of the
permitting boards and, if needed, an environmental assessment.
While each of these boards regulates particular resources, as a whole, the
MVRMA reflects a broader shift to co-management as a form of participatory
governance. 38 Formed as an alternative to the centralized decision making typical
of resource management, it is a model for shared decision making that uses the
direct participation of affected citizens. The AVRA bolsters public participatory
procedures that are meant to legitimize public administration but that can ex37. MVRMA, supra note 2, s9.1.
38. Sari M Graben, 'Assessing Stakeholder Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-Management:
Administrative Rulemaking and Private Agreement" (2011) 29 Windsor YB Access Just 195.
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clude or silence particular kinds of marginalized communities.39
The MVRMA4 and the treaties on which it is based pose interpretive challenges
because they do not explicitly establish substantive goals for participation. To be
sure, the MIVRMAI incorporates a number of procedures meant to promote the
participation of particular First Nations in resource management. For instance, the
preamble links the purpose of legislation to the treaties where it states:
WHEREAS the Gwich'in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement and the Sahtu
Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement require the establishment
of land use planning boards and land and water boards for the settlement areas
referred to in those Agreements and the establishment of an environmental impact
review board for the Mackenzie Valley, and provide as well for the establishment of
a land and water board for an area extending beyond those settlement areas; ......

Moreover, the preamble links the purpose of the boards to the treaties where it states:
AND WHEREAS the intent of the Agreements as acknowledged by the parties is to
establish those boards for the purpose of regulating all land and water uses, including
deposits of waste, in the settlement areas for which they are established or in the
Mackenzie Valley, as the case may be; ...41

Furthermore, several important provisions in both the treaties and the
MVRMA implement distinctive participatory rights of Aboriginal governments
and persons in the Mackenzie Valley. These provisions relate generally to new

39. For discussion of the issue more generally, see Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of
Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). In many ways, this observation
confirms similar scholarship that questions whether Indigenous participation in the state's
legal institutions has resulted in the incorporation of Indigenous perspectives on the law. For
examples of these accounts, see James Youngblood Henderson, First NationsJurisprudence
andAboriginalRights: Defining the Just Society (Saskatoon: Houghton Boston, 2006) at
128-77. See also Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders ofSaskatchewan:
Our Dream is That Our People Will One Day be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary:
University of Calgary Press, 2000); Menno Boldt, Anthony J Long & Leroy Little Bear,
eds, The QuestforJustice:AboriginalPeoplesandAboriginalRights (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985); Leroy Little Bear, Menno Boldt, & Anthony J Long, eds, Pathways
to Self-Determination:Canadian Indiansand the CanadianState (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1984). In the administrative realm, see Catherine Bell & David Kahane, eds,
InterculturalDispute Resolution in AboriginalContexts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Lorne
Sossin, "The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal Rights"
(2010) 23 Can J Admin L & Prac 93.
40. MVRMA, supra note 2, Preamble.
41. Ibid.
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institutions, numerical representation,42 traditional environmental knowledge, 43
and public concern. 4 They also address the protection of social, cultural, and
economic well-being;45 the particularization of benefits to certain management
4

areas; 4" and the duty to consult.

Despite these innovations to increase opportunities to address Aboriginal
peoples' perspectives, the statute does not state how participation affects the
interpretation of the MVRMA or decision making. For example, the MVRMA
requires that nominees of Aboriginal governments nominate 50 per cent of board
members, but it leaves the purpose of those nominations to inference.' 8 A second
example is the Review Board's obligation to ensure that the concerns of Aboriginal
people and the public are taken into account. 4' The statute gives no guidance as
to the relative weight to be accorded to such concerns, nor does it clarify the difference between Aboriginal concerns and those-of the general public.
Ultimately, the language of the MVRMA and the treaties does not explicitly
indicate the substantive goals of Aboriginal participation. In order to understand
the role of the MVRMA in achieving participation, it is therefore essential
to return to the political objectives of co-management and their manifestation
in the treaties. Co-management has two main objectives: resolving the political conflicts between Aboriginal peoples and state government by restructuring
relations and improving the technical management of natural resources through
cooperation.

50

As it relates to improved management, participation is expected to offer a
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

Tlicho Land ClaimAgreement, supra note 6, art 22.2.3; Gwichin Land Claim Agreement, supra
note 4, art 24.3.7.
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 115.1; Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, ibid, art 22.1.7.
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 125; Tlicho Land ClaimAgreement, ibid, art 22.2.12.
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 115(b); Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, ibid, art 22.2.26(a); Gwich'in
Land Claim Agreement, supra note 4, art 24.3.12.
MVRMA, supra note 2, ss 58, 58.1; Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, ibid, art 22.2.26 (a), (d).
MVRMA, snpra note 2, ss 123.1, 127.1; Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, ibid,art 22.2.11.
In relation to the Review Board, see MVRMA, supra note 2, ss 112(1)-(3). In relation to
the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board, see ibid, s 99. In relation to the Sahtu Land
Use Planning Board, see ibid, s 38. In relation to the Sahtu Land and Water Board, see ibid,
s 56. In relation to the Gwich'in Land Use Planning Board, see ibid, s 36. In relation to
the Gwich'in Land and Water Board, see ibid, s 54. In relation to the Wekeezhii Land and
Water Board, see ibid, s 57.1. See also Tlicho Land Claim Agreement, supra note 6, art 22.2.3;
Gwich'in Land Claim Agreement, supra note 4, art 24.3.7.
MVRMA, supra note 2, s 114(c).
David Natcher, Susan Davis & Clifford G Hickey, "Co-Management: Managing
Relationships, Not Resources" (2005) 64 Human Organization 240 at 240. The authors add
a third goal: recognizing the knowledge and wisdom of Aboriginal peoples.
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greater base of knowledge with which to address the problem of unsustainable,
ineffective, or unfair resource management regimes. Advocates expect that the
integration of traditional and science-based knowledge and devolution to local
organizations will result in more holistic ecosystem management and will alter
regulation."1 This expectation is mirrored in the MVRMA and the treaties. For
example, statutory provisions that require the use of traditional knowledge
reinforce the power of the agencies to search out and use oral histories and elder
2
testimonies as part of the evidentiary record.1
As it relates to political conflict, Indigenous participation in co-management
is expected to resolve challenges to the legitimacy of state management by
redistributing rights and duties in order to promote community involvement in
decision making. 3 Although there are differences in the arguments advanced by
scholars who advocate for conceptualizing participation as power sharing, they
each posit co-management boards as conduits for political authority aimed at
empowering Aboriginal peoples.5 More to the point, an understanding of the
51.

For a summary of this approach and contrary evidence, see Gary P Kofinas, "Caribou
Hunters and Researchers at the Co-management Interface: Emergent Dilemmas and the
Dynamics of Legitimacy in Power Sharing" (2005) 47 Anthopologica 179 at 180. For an
argument that decentralized management is effective for resource use, see Evelyn Pinkerton,
ed, Co-operativeManagement of Local Fisheries:New Directionsfor Improved Management
and Community Development (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); John
Donihee, The Evolution of Wildlife Law in Canada (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources
Law, 2000) at 17. For difficulties with implementation, see Graham White, "Cultures in
Collision: Traditional Knowledge and Euro-Canadian Governance Processes in Northern
Land-Claim Boards" (2006) 59 Arctic 401.
52. MVRMA, supra note 2, ss 115.1, 146, 150.
53. Kofinas, supra note 51 at 180. See also Joseph J Spaeder & Harvey A Feit, "Co-management
and Indigenous Communities: Barriers and Bridges to Decentralized Resource Management:
Introduction" (2005) 47 Anthropologica 147 at 151; M E Mulrennan & C H Scott, "Comanagement-An Attainable Partnership? Two Cases From James Bay, Northern Quebec
and Torres Strait, Northern Queensland" (2005) 47 Anthropologica 197 at 198; Peter J
Usher, "Contemporary Aboriginal Land, Resource and Environmental Regimes: Origins,
Problems and Prospects," CD-ROM: For Seven Generations:An Information Legacy of the
Royal Commissionfor Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Libraxus, 1997).
54. A significant body of empirical research contradicts claims that numerical representation is
sufficient for meaningful participation. Scholars have observed that local decision-making
capacity is effectively stifled by the failure to imbue the resource management process with
Indigenous values and beliefs and by the persistent authority of the federal government. Both
phenomena can have the effect of tokenizing local input. See e.g. Marc G Stevenson, "The
Possibility of Difference: Rethinking Co-management" (2006) 65 Human Organization
167; Marc G Stevenson, "Decolonizing Co-Management in Northern Canada' (2004) 28
Cultural Survival Quarterly 68; Stella Spak, "The Position of Indigenous Knowledge in
Canadian Co-management Organizations" (2005) 47 nthropologica 233; Paul Nadasdy,
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MVRIA as a deliberate effort to promote political participation derives from its
connection to contemporary treaty negotiation in the Mackenzie Valley. Starting
in the 1970s, the federal government began to pursue resource development in
the region. In response to this development and to the growing recognition of
Aboriginal rights, groups began to assert their political autonomy to determine
resource use in the region.55 This assertion laid the groundwork for the political
and participatory arrangements contained within contemporary treaties, including
co-management.
The treaties reflect these goals for political participation through a number
of provisions. For instance, the preamble of the Gwich'in Land Claim Agreement
declares a number of objectives, including:
To provide the Gwich'in with wildlife harvesting rights and the right to participate
in decision concerning wildlife harvesting management; [and]
[t]o provide the Gwich'in the right to participate in decision making concerning the
56
use, management and conservation of land, water and resources.
The same agreement addresses participation in environmental assessment

where it states:
An Environmental Impact Review Board ("the Review Board") shall be established
as the main instrument for the conduct of environmental impact assessment and
review in the Mackenzie Valley.
The Review Board shall have equal membership from nominees of aboriginal groups
and of government, not including the chairperson. No less than one member of the
57
board shall be a nominee of the Gwich'in Tribal Council.

Thus, Parliament's intent to increase participation is partially realized
through the requirement that persons nominated by First Nation governments
constitute equal or majority membership on the boards. Each of the First Nation
governments in the region nominates or appoints members to the board. 8 The

55.
56.
57.
58.

Hunters and Bureaucrats:Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-StateRelations in the Southwest
Yukon (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003).
Peter J Usher, "Environment, Race and Nation Reconsidered: Reflections on Aboriginal Land
Claims in Canada" (2003) 47 Can Geographer 365 at 374.
Supra note 4, arts 1.1.6-1.1.7.
Ibid, art 24.3.2.
Pursuant to the MVRMA, the federal minister appoints all members of the board, and the
Sahtu and Gwich'in each nominate their members for appointment. The notable exceptions
are those members who are directly appointed by the Tlicho government. See MVRMA,
supra note 2, ss 11(1), 112(1)-(3).
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territorial minister and federal government nominate the remaining members.
This use of representative membership institutes a participatory model and
challenges the principle that centralized management is an appropriate tool for
resource management in the Mackenzie Valley.
Moreover, representation in co-management is directly related to regulatory
interest. As might be expected, representation is delineated in accordance with
the type of rights that a First Nation government holds in relation to the land.
Where the First Nation government is thought to have a greater vested interest
in the outcome, such as a project conducted on its settlement land, it is granted
greater representation on the boards. Where its interest is deemed lesser or is only
one among other interested governments, its representation is decreased correspondingly. The shifting composition of a board reflects an attempt to allocate
board membership in accordance with an estimation of a First Nation government's interest in the proposal. Thus, while the MVRALA does not itself delineate
self-government, it is a part of the larger movement to actualize Aboriginal rights
to self-government in Canada over the past forty years.5 9 Seen in this context, the
purpose of the MVRMA is to use innovative participatory techniques in order
to share resource management and the exercise of related administrative powers,
such as interpreting the MVRMA.
A good example of this same reasoning is found in applications for judicial
review of decisions affecting the Mackenzie Valley. These cases reflect the general
principle that the constitution of co-management boards demonstrates a clear
intent to represent the perspective of the relevant Aboriginal peoples in decision
making. For example, in the Federal Court decision in Ka'a'Gee Tu FirstNation v
Canada (Ministerof Indian and Northern Affairs),60 Justice Blanchard considered
the connection between the purpose of the boards and their composition. Citing
Hansard, he concluded that representation on the board is meant to give Aboriginal
peoples and other Northerners a role in resource management decisions.61 Similarly, in Dene Tha' FirstNation v Canada,62 Justice Phelan discussed the roles of
the Dene Tha' and other Aboriginal peoples in the region with respect to resource
management. He remarked that the land claim agreements established the means
59.

For a discussion of the origins of co-management in Canada and whether it is a success,
see Paul Nadasdy, "The Anti-Politics of TEK: The Institutionalization of Co-Management
Discourse" (2005) 47 Anthropologica 215 at 216 [Nadasdy, "Anti-Politics"].
60. Supra note 30.
61. Ibid at paras 43-47 (citing House of Commons Debates,36th Par, 1stSess, vol 135, no 023,
(19 October 1997) at page 1296; Debates of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal
Peoples, 36th Parl, 1st Sess, no 10 (17 June 1998)).
62. Supra note 29 at paras 65-67, 70.
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by which Aboriginal peoples could have an ongoing say in land use and that
nominating membership is the means by which it is achieved.
The approach to statutory interpretation advocated in the recent Supreme
Court decision Quebec (AG) v Moses lends further support to the inference that
Parliament intended co-management to facilitate Aboriginal participation in
decision making. 3 In Moses, a slim majority of the Court declared that interpretation should be decided on the basis of the written terms of the James Bay and
Northern Quebec Agreement that the parties had negotiated. This approach was
advocated by the majority as preferable to the dissent's reliance on an interpretation
that was reasonable and consistent with parties' intentions and overall context,
including the legal context of negotiations."1 Nevertheless, both the majority and
dissent incorporated the treaty's objective of Cree participation into their analysis and used it to support their dichotomous findings. The dissent denied the
legality of a CEAA assessment that did not account for procedures outlined in
the treaty and found that it undermined the terms for Cree participation. The
majority disagreed and held that the creation of new assessment procedures was
consistent with the terms of the agreement and did not put the participatory
rights of the Cree at risk. However, irrespective of whether the Court agreed on
whether the decision upheld or denigrated the rights of the Cree to participate
in environmental assessment, the Court affirmed Cree participation as a central
principle of the treaty itself and emphasized that interpretation should uphold
this principle.6"
What is important for the purposes of this article is that both objectives of
co-management-resolution of political conflict and technical managementrely on the use of a procedural technique: participation. Of course, for some time
now, Aboriginal peoples have used participatory processes available to the public
as well as processes particular to Aboriginal peoples, such as the duty to consult,
to present their views.66 However, in contrast to these participatory mechanisms,
co-management allows Aboriginal citizens to move beyond procedure and partic-

63.
64.
65.

66.

Supra note 24.
Ibid at para 6; JBNQA, supra note 24.
Moses, stepra note 24 at paras 17, 83. However, it is arguable that in Moses, the majority
conveyed that it will uphold the terms of the treaty strictly, even it if it undermines
participatory rights that the parties might have intended.
See e.g. HaidaNation v British Columbia (Ministerof Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511; Taku River
Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (ProjectAssessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550.
Whether the duty to consult can be characterized as a process defined by procedure rather
than by substantive powers is still unsettled in the law. For discussion on its characteristics
vis-.-vis other procedural rights, see Sossin, supra note 39.
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ipate as substantive decision makers at multiple stages of regulation.6 7 Aboriginal
stakeholders do not merely have procedural rights to access relevant information,
to make submissions on environmental decisions, and 'to use courts to enforce
consideration of their viewpoints. Instead, Aboriginal peoples are now part of the
institutions in which collective decisions are deliberated in order to achieve better
power sharing and better technical management. The MVRMA incorporates participants who can presumably contribute knowledge about how development will
impact Aboriginal peoples in the region. Thus, the treaties assume that having
Aboriginal persons make decisions will result in the achievement of better resource
management and shared power. Through this reasoning, the substantive objectives
of the MVRMA become enmeshed with the procedural ones, and participation
becomes a technique of regulation. 8

II. IMPLEMENTING PARTICIPATION IN THE COURTS
If the resolution of political conflicts and better technical management are the
objectives of co-management and participation is the technique, the salient legal
question is whether the MVRAIA operates in a manner which promotes or prevents the realization of these objectives. The role that participation plays in the
interpretation of contemporary treaties has so far gone unexamined in the legal
scholarship. However, examples taken from the trilogy of cases presented here
suggests that implementing legal norms that result from participation could be
complicated for the courts.
There are only a handful of cases that interpreted the MVRA4, 69 and only
three have interpreted it in light of other statutory schemes. So far, the courts
have unanimously stated that nothing in the MVRMA suggests that Parliament
intended to completely shelter boards' decisions from scrutiny.7" However, the
level of deference owed to board decisions is not settled. The courts have gener-

67.

For discussion of comparable regimes, see Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening
Democracy: Innovations in Empowered ParticipatoryGovernance (London, UK: Verso, 2003);
Nadasdy, "Anti-Politics," supra note 59 at 216.
68. For discussion of this effect in regulation more generally, see Julia Black "Proceduralizing
Regulation: Part 1"(2000) 20 Oxford J Legal Stud 597 at 597. Black describes procedures,
participation, and institutional design as the common solutions to perceived regulatory problems.
69. See e.g. Ka'a'Gee, supra note 29; Tungsten, supra note 2; NahanniButte Dene Band v Canadian
Zinc Corp (2005), 285 FTR 26; CanadianZinc, supra note 2; De Beers, supra note 2; BHP
Billiton DiamondsInc v Wek' ezhii Land and Water Board, [2010] WWR 682 (NWTSC);
Tlicho, supra note 32.
70. Tungsten CA, supra note 2 at para 16.
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ally interpreted the MVRA4 to incorporate the principle of increasing Aboriginal
participation. 71 These cases reflect the principle that the constitution of co-management boards demonstrates a clear intent to have the perspective of the relevant
Aboriginal peoples represented and incorporated into decision making. Based on
this understanding, the courts have so far adopted the standard of reasonableness
72
for review of factual issues and a standard of correctness for issues of law.
It has been within this paradigm of correctness that the courts, through
a series of decisions, have recently reviewed statutory interpretations of the
MVRMA proffered by the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board and the
Review Board. Of those cases that have subjected board interpretations of the
MVRMA to judicial review, three cases have interpreted its meaning in light of
its predecessor statute, the CEAA. These three cases highlight the different outcomes that result depending on whether the two legislative schemes are viewed
as harmonious or distinct. Through these cases, the courts have explicitly and
implicitly grappled with the relationship between participation and statutory
interpretation. Assumptions about the drafting and intention of the MVRMA
influence whether it is seen as similar to or different from the CEAA. Thus, where
the MVRMA is understood to incorporate much of the same structure of the
CEAA, it is interpreted as carrying forward much of the same meaning. In these
cases, however, little thought has been given to how the boards' interpretations of
the MVRMAI represent particular meaning that is not represented in the CEAA.
In contrast, where the participatory goals of the MVRAI are distinguished from
the CEAA, interpretive differences are allowed. The following three summaries
introduce the central interpretive issues upon which the decisions turned.
A.

NORTH AMERICAN TUNGSTEN CORP LTD VMACKENZIE VALLEY LAND AND
WATER BOARD

In North American Thngsten Corp Ltd v Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board,73
the Northwest Territories Supreme Court and Court of Appeal considered the
interpretive similarities between the MVRMA and the CEAA. In this case, North
American Tungsten applied for a water licence renewal for a mine and milling
operation. It first received the licence in 1975 and renewed it at various intervals.
The company argued that because it sought a renewal, it fell under a clause that
grandfathered its exemption from environmental assessment. Due to concerns
that the mine had been closed for many years, that it was under new ownership,
71. Ka'a'Gee, supra note 29 at para 47.
72. CanadianZinc, supra note 2 at paras 18-33.
73. Tungsten, supra note 2.
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that there had been a spill following its recent re-opening, and that there was
little planning for imminent mine closure, various parties advocated that North
American Tungsten was applying for a new licence, not for a renewal. The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board decided that the exemption did not apply and
that the licence application required an environmental assessment.
The case turned on the interpretation of section 157.1 of the MVRMA.
Generally, the MVRMA requires that proposals comply with an environmental
assessment process consisting of a preliminary screening by the regulatory authority and, if applicable, an environmental assessment by the Review Board. Section
157.1 exempts a "licence, permit or other authorization related to an undertaking
that is the subject of a licence or permit issued before 22 June 1984." The case and
its subsequent appeal turned on whether section 157.1 grandfathers a licence issued
prior to 22 June 1984 or an undertakinglicensed prior to 22 June 1984.
The Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board focussed on whether Tungsten's
current water licence was a continuation of a licence issued before 22 June 1984.
T-he Board concluded that the application was, in effect, an application for a new
licence and therefore not exempted. Tungsten applied to the Northwest Territories Supreme Court for judicial review of the Board's decision. On judicial review,
Tungsten and the Attorney General argued that section 157.1, when read in its
statutory context and in light of section 74(4) of the CEAA, exempted Tungsten's
application. They argued that despite different language, section 157.1 was meant
to mirror the meaning of section 74(4) of the CEAA, which grandfathers undertakings or projects that were commenced or underway before 22 June 1984." 'Thus,
the Attorney General argued that the exemption in section 157.1 applied to Tungsten and that the Board was incorrect in holding that it did not.
Justice Schuler of the Northwest Territories Supreme Court disagreed
with the interpretation offered by Tungsten and the Attorney General. Most
importantly, he disagreed with the premise that the MVRMA should be interpreted in accordance with the CEAA. 75 Using a purposive approach to statutory

74. Section 157.1 of the MVRMA states, "Part 5 does not apply in respect of any licence, permit
or other authorization related to an undertaking that is the subject of a licence or permit
issued before June 22, 1984 .... " See MVRMA, supra note 2. Section 74(4) of the CEAA
states, "Where the construction or operation of a physical work or the carrying out of a
physical activity was initiated before June 22, 1984, this Act shall not apply in respect of the
issuance or renewal of a licence, permit, approval or other action under a prescribed provision
in respect of the project .... " See CEAA, supra note 1.
75. The court found this assumption inconsistent with the intent to vest regulatory power in
Indigenous peoples, as set out in the AVRAI preamble. See Tungsten SC, supra note 2 at para 33.
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interpretation, 6 he interpreted section 157.1 in the context of the entire statutory scheme, the object of the MVRMA, and the intention of Parliament. To
Justice Schuler, the preamble and purpose section of the MVRA4A revealed that
the statute's object was to create a differentiated scheme for land and water use
management in the Mackenzie Valley. To this end he stated, "Since the MVRA4
replaces the CEAA and contains different language from the latter, it is clear
that the intent was not simply to re-create the CEAA regime under the auspices
of new legislation.""7 Based on the principle that the MVRM4A and CEAA are
to be interpreted distinctly, he argued that the change in wording from section
74(4) of the CEAA to section 157.1 of the MVRAA is significant. The change in
wording "indicates a shift away from grandfathering 'old', that is, pre-June 22,
1984 undertakings, to grandfathering only those undertakings which still hold
a licence issued before June 22, 1984."78 He recognized that the consequence of
this interpretation was that undertakings that would be grandfathered under the
CEAA would not be grandfathered under the MVRMA. However, he ascribed
this intention to the legislators.79
The Northwest Territories Court of Appeal did not share Justice Schuler's
interpretation. It overturned his findings and held for Tungsten. Interestingly,
the court also used a purposive approach to interpretation and read the section
in the context of the statute as a whole." However, it found that the object and
intent of the statute supported the position that section 157.1 was meant to
parallel the CEAA by grandfathering old undertakings and exempting them from
review. The court noted that the stated purpose of the statute was to establish
boards that would enable residents of the Mackenzie Valley to participate in
resource management. However, the court argued that another purpose of the
MVRMA was to grandfather existing developments in order to balance competing interests. 8' Against this construction of the object of the MVRAA, the
Court of Appeal examined the specific wording of section 157.1 and read it as
complementary to the CEAA.82 The court found that similar wording as to the
date before which licences are grandfathered reflected Parliament's intention to
have the provisions treated similarly.83 However, different wording was meant
76. Bell Express Limited Partnershipv Rex, [2002] 2 SCR 559 at paras 26-27.
77. Tungsten SC, supra note 2 at para 18.
78. Ibidat para 31.
79. Ibid
80. Tungsten CA, supra note 2 at para 21.
81. Ibid at para 24.
82. Ibidat para 29.
83. Ibid.
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to reflect an attempt to address some interpretive difficulties that had arisen
around the word "initiated" in the CEAA, an issue unrelated to this case.84 In
short, the court denied that the difference in wording between the two statutes
was meant to reflect a parliamentary intention to broaden the scope of projects
subject to assessment."
In its concluding remarks, the Court of Appeal focussed on the policy implications of the lower court's holding. It reasoned that if the lower court's holding
was correct, then as of 22 June 2009, no undertakings requiring water licences
would be grandfathered since the longest water licence possible under the
Waters Act was twenty-five years.86 Absent a clear intention of Parliament, the
court rejected an interpretation of section 157.1 that would require all water licence
renewals to be subject to a full-scale environmental review by that date. To the
court, such an approach seemed inconsistent with the concept of grandfathering
and would strip section 157.1 of certainty, fairness, and ultimately effect because
grandfathering would be understood as a passing state under the YR MA.
B.

CANADIAN ZINC CORP V MACKENZIE VALLEY LAND AND WATER BOARD

A subsequent case that considered the same issue in the context of a licence to
use a winter road came before Justice Schuler in CanadianZinc Corp v Mackenzie
Valley Land and Water Board.87 Canadian Zinc Corp. (CZC) bought mine assets
from Cadillac, a bankrupt corporation that held an expired licence to use the
winter road. On applying for a licence, CZC submitted to the Mackenzie Valley
Land and Water Board that it should have the benefit of the section 157.1 exemption because Cadillac held a permit issued before 22 June 1984. The Board
concluded that CZC was involved in a different undertaking than that in which
Cadillac was involved before 22 June 1984. Consequently, it held that the permit
sought by CZC "[was] not in respect of the undertaking originally permitted to
Cadillac."88 The issue was whether an exempted licence under section 157.1 must

84.

According to the court, prior uncertainty over what is meant by the word "initiated" under
the CEAA provoked Parliament to alter section 157.1 to refer to an event which could be
easily and conclusively established for a given project without litigation, that is, the actual
date on which a licence or permit had been issued. Ibid at para 30.
85. Ibid at para 29. On the contrary, the court mused that the MIVRMA exemption may be
broader than that under CEAA since the MVRMA exemption applies as long as the relevant
licence or permit was issued prior to 22 June 1984, regardless of whether physical work on
the project had been initiated by that date.
86. Waters Act, supra note 16.
87. CanadianZinc, supra note 2.
88. Ibidatpara 10.
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have some relationship in terms of subject matter, substance, and direct linkage
to the licence in respect of which a renewal application has been filed.
Justice Schuler considered the meaning of "undertaking" under section
157.1. CZC argued that the undertaking in question was the winter access road.
In contrast, the intervenors argued that the undertaking was the larger enterprise engaged in by CZC. Both relied in part on the Northwest Territories Court
of Appeal decision in Tungsten to support their positions. For his part, Justice
Schuler relied on Tungsten for the proposition that the MVRMA and the CEAA
are meant to complement each other. Consequently, he interpreted "undertaking" in a way that would align its meaning with the language of the CEAA even
though section 74(4) of the CEAA does not use the word "undertaking."89 He
advocated consistency and stated:
In my view, to be consistent with the CEAA and the context and purpose of the
legislation as described in Tungsten, the definition of undertaking must parallel the
wording used in the CEAA and not focus solely on the physical "thing", that is, the
winter access road. 90

Based on his declared need for interpretive consistency with the CEAA, Justice Schuler substituted the Board's interpretation of the scope of the undertaking
with its own interpretation premised on the terms "work" or "activity" used in
the CEAA.9 1 By doing so, he reduced the scope of the Board's oversight of the
mining operation by confining it to the operation of the winter road. This interpretation divorced the use of the road from the larger mining operation carried
on by CZC.
In turning his mind to whether there needed to be a direct linkage between
the permit that expired prior to 22 June 1984 and the current one being sought
by CZC, Justice Schuler again turned to the CEAA for interpretive guidance.
He reasoned that a purpose of both the CEAA and the MVRMA is to exempt
projects from environmental assessment when significant resources have already
89.

90.
91.

Section 74(4) of the- CEAA uses the language "physical work or the carrying out of a physical
activity" and "project." "Project" is defined as "in relation to a physical work, any proposed
construction, operation, modification, decommissioning, abandonment or other undertaking
in relation to that physical work." See CEAA, supra note 1, ss 2(1), 74(4).
CanadianZinc, supra note 2 at para 51.
CanadianZinc, ibid at para 54. The court stated:
If the MVRMA and CEAA are meant to be complementary pieces of legislation, one would
not expect the legislators to change the focus from a physical work or activity under CEAA to
the larger business or enterprise within which that physical work or activity takes place under
MVRMA, in determining whether a project is grandfathered and exempt from environmental
assessment.
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been expended on them. As such, he reasoned that where a project has been taken
over by a new owner who has also expended significant resources to acquire the
project, the exemption follows the project: "In other words, it is the project or
undertaking that is exempt from s. 157.1, not the owner or the permit holder."92
Based on this understanding, Justice Schuler concluded that the mere desire
to operate the winter access road was a sufficient connection in terms of subject
matter and substance between CZC's proposed undertaking and Cadillac's
undertaking. He denied the need to establish the continuity of ownership in
order to benefit from the exemption, even though the licence had lapsed. The
mere fact that it had existed prior to 22 June 1984 allowed it to vest in the new
owner of the mine.
C.

DE BEERS CANADA INC V MACKENZIE VALLEY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
REVIEW BOARD

The third and most recent case to contemplate the relationship between the
MVRMA and the CEAA is De Beers CanadaInc v Mackenzie Valley Environmental
Impact Review Board.93 The reasoning in this case departs significantly from the
earlier decisions and, importantly, differentiates the MVRMA from the CEAA. In
this case, De Beers sought judicial review of a Review Board order for an environmental impact review, where an environmental assessment had been started
but not completed. This order ran contrary to requirements established pursuant
to the CEAA.
The case turned on three issues. The first issue was whether the Review Board
had the authority to order a more stringent examination of the development's
effects through an environmental impact assessment, without first completing
an environmental assessment. The second issue was whether the Review Board
committed other errors that exceeded its jurisdiction (such as sub-delegating, prejudging the issue, and considering irrelevant factors). The last issue was whether
the Review Board erred in finding that the project was likely to be a cause of
9
significant public concern.
The court's reasoning on each of the three issues presented in the case reflected
a particular construction of parliamentary intent. For instance, vis- -vis the interpretation of the term "public concern" in the MVRMA, the court inferred that

92.
93.
94.

Ibidat para 68.
Supra note 2.
Ibid. The court characterized the first two issues as matters of statutory interpretation, for
which no deference was owed to the Review Board. It characterized the last issue, whether
there was public concern, as an issue of fact, for which considerable deference was warranted.
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Aboriginal people were intended to have meaningful input into this process. Parliament intended that potential environmental impacts and public concern be important
factors for the Review Board in making decisions. Parliament also intended that the
preservation of social, cultural and economic well-being of the residents of the region
and the importance of conservation to well-being and way of life of aboriginal people
95
be taken into account.

In relation to process, the court recognized Parliament's intent to use the
Review Board's composition to balance the complex and potentially conflicting
factors it must take into account in an environmental assessment.96 Based on
this particular argument, the court addressed De Beers's position that the court
should use the same understanding of "consideration" as used in section 16 of
the CFAA and interpreted in another case. 7 Interestingly, the court found the
analogy to the CEAA unconvincing. Justice Charbonneau recognized the use of
similar language in different statutes as helpful to interpretation but rejected its
application here. Instead, she declared, "I am not persuaded, however, that the
meaning given to the term 'consideration' in the context of the CEAA is particu'
larly helpful in resolving the statutory interpretation issue in this case."98
Justice Charbonneau cited various reasons for this interpretive turn: that the
term "consideration" is not a particularly technical word, that use of the word
"consideration" instead of "determination" is significant, and that the ordinary
meaning of the word does not imply exhaustive review. In addition, the court
distinguished the MVRAL4 from the CEAA. Justice Charbonneau noted that
while there are some similarities between the two statutes, there are also some
differences. More specifically, she noted that the MVRMA is "unique in the context of its adoption, the importance of the role given to the Review Board, and
the importance it places on public concern."99
Based on this interpretive difference, the court upheld the Review Board's
interpretation and its power to order an environmental impact assessment without first completing the environmental assessment. In doing so, the court allowed
the Review Board to implement different requirements than those used in other
jurisdictions. Interestingly, the court grounded its support for the Review Board's
actions in its distinctive goals.

95. Ibidat para 25.
96. Ibid at para 26.
97. Alberta Wilderness Assn v CardinalRiver Coals Ltd (1999), 165 FTR 1.
98. De Beers, supra note 2 at para 37.
99. Ibid.
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III. ASSESSING ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
HARMONIZATION
To date, these are the only three cases to explicitly contemplate the relationship
between the MVRMA and the CEAA. Because there are only a limited number
of cases to draw upon, it is difficult to formulate durable conclusions about their
authority and meaning. That being said, the Court of Appeal in Tungsten is
currently the leading authority on this issue in the Northwest Territories. Both
Tungsten and CanadianZinc stand for the proposition that Parliament intended
the meaning of section 157.1 in the MVRMA to be harmonized with that of the
CEAA. The courts did not use the term "harmonization" in their judgments,
preferring the term "complementary." ' However, the critical question guiding
the interpretation and application of the MVRMvA in these cases was whether
Parliament intended the MVRMA to be interpreted in accordance with the CEAA.
In Tungsten, the principle of harmonization led to the finding that, like the CEAA,
the MVRMA grandfathers undertakings (rather than licences). In CanadianZinc,
this principle led to the finding that the MVRMA grandfathers undertakings, as
defined by the terms "work" or "activity" that dictate assessment in the CEAA.
A. FOR HARMONIZATION
Despite the fact that the CEAA no longer applies to determine issues of environmental assessment in the Mackenzie Valley, it is arguable that the courts are
not precluded legally from comparing analogous language in order to derive
parliamentary intent. This comparative exercise is a common tool of statutory
interpretation used across jurisdictions. It is also arguable that the courts are
correct to assume that Parliament is partial to harmonization and intended the
MVRMA to be interpreted in accordance with the CEAA at certain times. There
are three indicators of this intention, which can be derived from the construction
of the MVRMA.
First, there are striking similarities between the two statutes, suggesting that
the CEAA is the MVRMA's template for environmental assessment.0 ' While
there are differences, a comparison of the two statutes reveals that the general
100. Tungsten CA, supra note 2 at para 29; CanadianZinc, supra note 2 at paras 54, 65.
101. For the argument that greater attention should be paid to how administrators or their
associated interest groups impact the promulgation of legislation by bringing legislation into
existence,-commenting on proposed legislation, and consulting on technical language, see
HW Arthurs, 'Without the Law:"AdministrativeJustice and Legal Pluralism in NineteenthCentury England (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 135.
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purpose and procedures of the two statutes are similar. Environmental assessment
is a planning tool that requires early identification and evaluation of all potential environmental consequences of a proposed development and its alternatives.
This tool is combined with a decision-making process that attempts to reconcile
any approval of the proposed development with environmental protection and
preservation.102 To this end, both the CEAA and MYRMA set up the regulatory
scheme for environmental assessment and establish its process. They both aim
to use their procedures to predict the environmental effects of proposed projects
before they are carried out, to propose measures to mitigate those effects, and
to predict whether there will be significant adverse effects even after mitigation
is implemented. Thus, commentators have remarked that while the MVRMA
represents a geographically sensitive approach to environmental assessment, it
incorporates much of the same structure as the CEAA.1 3
In terms of procedure, both statutes subject proposals to a graduated assessment scheme that routes the proposals to different levels of assessment depending
upon the likelihood of significant adverse impacts. Consequently, both statutes
subject certain proposals to a preliminary screening (a succinct examination of
a proposed development), while others are subjected to further environmental
assessment. For example, both statutes require a preliminary screening where
the government is involved with permitting, licensing, or authorizing a type
of project enumerated in the regulations. If the screening determines that a
proposal might have a significant adverse impact or might be a cause of public
concern, both statutes subject the proposal to further assessment. Both statutes
also exempt a proposal from screening where it does not involve a permit,
licence, or authorization and where the impact on the environment is insignificant or where the proposal involves an activity listed in an exempted or
excluded regulatory list.
It is noteworthy that the similarities just discussed are also shared with
other environmental assessment regimes across Canada.14 Therefore, just as
commonalities between provincial statutes may indicate an intention to incorporate similar meaning irrespective of jurisdiction, so too may commonalities
between the MVRMA and the CEAA evince such an intent. Nonetheless, if one

102. For an overview of environmental assessment and other means of regulating mining in
Canada, see Joseph F Castrilli, "Environmental Regulation of the Mining Industry in
Canada: An Update of Legal and Regulatory Requirements" (2000) 34 UBC L Rev 91.
103. Ibidat 121.
104. For discussion of schemes in Canada, see Kevin S Hanna, EnvironmentalImpact Assessment:
Practiceand Participation(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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assumes that common intent can be deduced from common purpose or process,
no conclusive statement can be made about Parliamentary intent vis- -vis the
MVRMA, given its procedural differences from the CEAA. In light of how
similar environmental assessment regimes tend to be, it is arguably the small
differences in process that can determine intention in any given case. For example, under the MVRMA, the Review Board has the power to refer projects
for environmental assessment on its own motion' or determine the scope
of the project for assessment," 6 whereas review panels struck pursuant to the
CEAA possess no comparable powers.
A second indicator that the two statutes warrant harmonization is their
shared use of regulatory lists that determine which proposals are automatically
included or excluded from screening. This explains why the Department of
Indian and Northern Affairs stated in its Regulatory Impact Analysis that the
Preliminary Screening Requirement Regulations and the Exemption List Regulation of the MVRMA have been "modelled on, and work in a similar fashion
to, the CanadianEnvironmental Assessment Act (CEAA) Law List Regulations
and the Exclusion List Regulations.""7
However, it is noteworthy that in rejecting the proposal that the MVRMA
should use exactly the same inclusion and exclusion regulations as the CEAA,
the department argued that the "proposed regulations are adapted to the
circumstances in the Mackenzie Valley. 'hey carry out Canada's obligation
respecting the implementation of the Gwich'in and Sahtu Land Claim Settlement Agreements." 0 8 Nonetheless, the department asserted that "[g]iven their
similarity to CEAA, they offer some familiarity and continuity throughout the
federal system."'0 9 Also, in weighing the benefits and costs of a different system in
the Mackenzie Valley, the department stated:
A system so similar to the CEAA regulations does not require much adaptation from
stakeholders, proponents and federal regulatory authorities or increase operating
costs. .. .the level of EAR [environmental assessment review] would not significantly

105. MVRMA, supra note 2, s 126(3). Contrast this with the CEAA, supra note 1, s 29(1), which
authorizes only the Minister.
106. MVRMA, ibid,s 117. Contrast this with the CEAA, ibid,ss 15(1), 16(3), which vest scoping
authority in the Minister or responsible authority.
107. Preliminary Screening Requirement Regulations (Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement),
(1998) C Gaz I, 1798 at 1799 [Government of Canada, "Impact Analysis Statement"]. For a
discussion of regulatory impact analysis statements see J Paul Salembier, Regulatory Law and
Practicein Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2004) at 83-94.
108. Government of Canada, "Impact Analysis Statement," supra note 107 at 1800.
109. Ibid at 1799.
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increase in the Mackenzie Valley. It is therefore not anticipated that these regulations
would limit competitiveness or unduly affect small and medium business more than
11 0
the current CEAA regulations.

It is questionable whether harmonization has resulted from a shared exclusion list. -he Review Board has already interpreted differences between the lists
in light of the treaties.11 However, these governmental statements reveal an intention
to create a system of northern resource management that implements treaty obligations but generally maintains continuity with systems already in place.112
Lastly, the courts' approach in favour of harmonization aligns with
the federal government's long-standing goal of harmonizing environmental
standards across the country. In Canada, federal environment ministers have
prioritized the harmonization of federal and provincial environmental standards
for the last twenty years. This tendency towards harmonization has resulted in
initiatives such as the Canada Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization, a
framework agreement between the federal and provincial governments to coordinate environmental programs and policies. 3 Aimed at achieving the benefits of
harmonization, its objectives are to "enhance environmental protection, promote
sustainable development; and achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, accountability, predictability and clarity of environmental management for issues of
Canada-wide interest ...
1.1 This preference for harmonization is evident in the

110. Ibidat 1800-01.
111. Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board. PreliminaryScreening Conducted
by Governments and First Nations as Developers: Subsection 124(2) of the Mackenzie Valley
Resource Management Act (Northwest Territories: Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact
Review Board, 2005), online: <http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/refilibrary/RefBulletinGovt_FNsasDevelopers9 198103760.pdf>.
112. For further evidence that the MVRMA is a product of federal conceptualizations of resource
management, see Julia Christensen & Miriam Grant, "How Political Change Paved the Way
for Indigenous Knowledge: The Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act" (2007) 60:2
Arctic 115 at 120.
113. In November 1993, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment agreed to make
harmonization a top priority. Following long consultations, negotiations, and draft attempts,
the thirteen ministers of the environment, representing the provincial, federal, and territorial
governments, signed the Canada-Wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization (1993),
online: < http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/accord-harmonizatione.pdf> [Canada-Wide
Accord]. See Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Guide to the Canada-Wide
Accord on EnvironmentalHarmonization (29 January 1998), online:
<http://www.ccme.ca/ourwork/environment.html?category-id=25>.
114. Canada-Wide Accord, supra note 113 at 1. For the benefits of harmonization, see Steven A
Kennett, "Interjurisdictional Harmonization of Environmental Assessment in Canada" in
Steven A Kennett, ed, Law and Process in EnvironmentalManagement: Essaysfrom the Sixth
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language of the MVRMA, which permits joint reviews to operate pursuant to the
CEAA. 115 Based on its long-standing attempts to promote harmonization, it is
safe to assume that the federal government would likely advocate interpretations
of the MVRMA that are consistent with the CEAA.
B. AGAINST HARMONIZATION
Despite the authority of the decisions to date, the principle of harmonization, as
used in these two cases, should be of limited application where Aboriginal participation is apparent and relevant to an interpretation by a board in the region.
The limited application of both Tungsten and Canadian Zinc can be ascribed
to the fact that neither of the cases speaks effectively to the broader issues of
Aboriginal participation, the origins of the MVRMA in treaties, or the impact
of harmonization on the participatory goals of Parliament. Instead, De Beers is
the leading case on interpretation when Aboriginal participation is involved. De
Beers stands for the proposition that when Aboriginal participation comes to the
fore, courts can rely on Parliament's intent for the MVRMA to reflect the value of
such participation in board decision making and related interpretation.
It is commonly acknowledged in the cases dealing with the MVRMA that the
context of its adoption (i.e., contemporary treaties) reflects a process aimed
at achieving political autonomy. Similarly, the central innovation of comanagement is its incorporation of participants who can presumably contribute
knowledge about the technical, social, or political issues of Aboriginal peoples
in the region. However, neither the court in Tungsten nor the court in Canadian
Zinc interpreted Aboriginal participation or the statute's origin in treaties to be
relevant to the construction of the Act's object vis-k-vis grandfathering. Instead,
the decisions in Tungsten and Canadian Zinc are characterized by their reliance
on related, but not exact, language found in the CEAA.
The importation of technical meaning from other statutes is common to
statutory interpretation. However, the normative basis for the courts' interpretations can be sourced to their construction of the purpose and object of the
legislation. 1 6 The Court of Appeal in Tungsten noted that the stated purpose of
the statute was to establish boards to enable residents of the Mackenzie Valley to
participate in resource management. However, it argued that the relevant purpose
of the MVRMA was to grandfather existing developments in order to balance
CIRL Conference on NaturalResources Law (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resource Law,
1993) 297.
115. MVRMA, supra note 2, s 130(1)(c).
116. Tungsten CA, supra note 2 at para 21.
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competing interests. 117 Against this construction of the object of the MVRMA,
the Court of Appeal turned its attention to the specific wording of section 157.1
and characterized it as complementary to the CEAA. 118 In short, the courts did
not seem to consider Aboriginal participation or the MVRMA's origin in treaties
to be relevant to its interpretive task.
Because the decisions do not address the relevance of participation, jurists
can only postulate whether it was an issue. Interestingly, both decisions reflected
on the expertise of co-management boards in establishing the standard of review
and found that the boards did not hold any special knowledge that warranted
deference to their views on statutory interpretation. The courts' view that the
boards lacked expertise may explain why they did not consider whether First
Nation perspectives on the statute were an issue." 9 Alternatively, the meaning
of grandfathering in legal doctrine may be so entrenched in law that the court
would have deemed First Nation perspectives irrelevant. Irrespective of the
reason, the courts overrode the boards' interpretations. In so doing, they did
not consider parliamentary intent vis- i-vis treaties or participation in enough
detail to permit conclusions about its relevance to statutory interpretation.
Similarly, neither of the courts in these two cases conveyed any thoughts
on the broader impact of harmonization on Aboriginal participation. While
the courts advocated harmonization, neither of them reflected on its positive or
negative impacts. This lacuna is problematic where harmonization supplants the
differentiated approaches to resource management that are reflected in boards'
statutory interpretations. Thus, courts may use harmonization to justify the
imposition of uniform norms instead of allowing for differentiated interpretation.
This rationalization is especially problematic in light of the MVRAi's intention
to reflect regional and Aboriginal perspectives on resource management117. Ibid at para 24.
118. Ibid at para 29.
119. The Dehcho Government was an intervenor in Canadian Zinc, supra note 2. The Tlicho
Government was an intervenor in De Beers, supra note 2. There was no Aboriginal
government intervenor in Tungsten, ibid. However, the Liidlii Kue First Nation made
submissions at the hearing for North American Tungsten's water licence renewal before
the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board. Letter from Chief Rita Cli, Liidlii Kue First
Nation, to Bob Wooley, Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (20 June 2002) online:
<http://www.reviewboard.ca/upload/projectdocument/EAO2-003-DOCO00-1 186676061.
PDF>. The Liidlii Kue First Nation also applied for party status to the Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Impact Review Board. Letter from Acting Chief Keyna Norwegian, Liidlii
Kue First Nation, to Luciano Azzolini, Environmental Assessment Officer, Mackenzie Valley
Environmental Impact Review Board (6 August 2002) online: <http://www.reviewboard.ca/
upload/project-document/EA02-003_DOCO1 111186688300.PDF>.
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perspectives that may be different from other regulatory schemes. However,
no aspect of this debate is reflected in the decisions. Instead, both Tungsten and
Canadian Zinc have found an intention to harmonize the meaning of the two
statutes in accordance with the meaning of the CEAA. The MVRMA will therefore be interpreted in accordance with principles that dictate outcomes in other
legislative schemes.
Ultimately, the courts' methodology is topical because they did not consider
whether the importation of meaning from the CEAA could have implications
for participation or treaty rights. Despite this omission, the courts nonetheless
developed principles that may affect these rights. The likelihood that courts
will continue to rule on divergent interpretations, especially where Aboriginal
participation is substantial, makes the methodological approach to ascertaining
parliamentary intent important. The potential effect of harmonization is notable in these cases because the rationales used to justify harmonization can allow
courts to divorce the potential impact of the MVRA's participatory provisions
from statutory interpretation. A focus on the parliamentary intent to harmonize the statutes can preclude differences and divert attention from the potential
impact of co-management on the meaning of the MVRMA. This preclusion results from reasoning that does not consider whether Aboriginal participation
can affect statutory interpretation. By doing so, the decisions convey a message
that co-management boards should not develop the meaning of their governing legislation to reflect the region in which they must operate. 2 In contrast, a
more complex conception of participation would reflect an understanding that
stakeholder participation can alter what the regulatory output looks like and that
board members play an essential role in achieving that change. In short, effective participation is a reflection of the ability to instantiate Aboriginal peoples'
perspectives in various regulatory outputs.
In addition, harmonization can impart a message that participation in comanagement regimes is a formal procedural requirement that has little to no
bearing on statutory interpretation. By failing to account for participation, the
courts unintentionally utilized a conception of participation that makes procedure (i.e., the physical presence of Aboriginal persons on a board or before a
120. For extensive discussion of statutory interpretation and standards of review, see Sara Blake,
"The Standard of Review Applied to the Interpretation of Statute" (Paper delivered at
Administrative Hot Topics, Best Practices: Everything You Need to Know In 2006!, OBA
Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Toronto, 23 January 2006); Marie-Hlkne Blais et
al,
eds, Standardsof Review of FederalAdministrativeTribunals, 2007 ed (Markham, Ontario:
LexisNexis Canada, 2006). See also Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan andDriedgeron the Construction
of Statutes, 4th ed (Markham, ON: Butterworths Canada, 2002).
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board) and not substantive change the primary objective of the MVRMA. Under
this conception, the goals of participation are met when the procedural requirements of the MVRMA are satisfied instead of when power sharing or better
resource management is achieved. Thus, once the statutory requirements for the
composition of a co-management board are fulfilled, there is no further thought
given to how a board might impact the use and interpretation of law. Rather,
meeting the formal requirements of the MVRALA is sufficient for the court to
pre-emptively assume that its substantive objectives have been met.
Should the courts apply the principle of harmonization to situations in which
Aboriginal participation is apparent and relevant, it can lead to facile assumptions that undermine the central objective of promoting Aboriginal participation
in the Mackenzie Valley. If the reasoning used in Tungsten and Canadian Zinc
precludes participation in statutory interpretation, it becomes unclear when or
how co-management promotes the perspectives of Aboriginal peoples. Instead,
judicial reasoning should ask whether an interpretation that is at odds with a
board's interpretation has the potential effect of ignoring the impact of participation
on regulatory output.
C. A CAUTIOUS APPROACH
All this is not to say that harmonization should never occur. Taken together, the
trilogy highlights that both harmonization and difference have a foundation in
the MVRMA. If, however, the conflicting cases and statutory provisions
illustrate how the legislative intent of the drafters can justify both harmonization and differentiation, which one is correct? The most likely (and unspoken)
reality that undermines either rationalization is that Parliament's intentions are
probably multiple and dichotomous. In all likelihood, its drafters intended both
harmonization and differentiation. As in other legislative schemes that attempt to
appease multiple and conflicting stakeholders, the MVRAIA was drafted to contain the possibility for difference (in accordance with treaty obligations) as well
as consistency with other environmental assessment schemes (which are familiar
and recognizable to industry-based users).
In light of this reality, the interpretive methodology used in the cases
behooves asking whether the meaning of the rules surrounding co-management
should be harmonized with those of the CEAA. The cases discussed here raise the
concern that harmonization of meaning can allow courts to ignore the context
from which rules came and where they are applied. It can allow resource management rules to be treated as universal, despite significant differences in context.
Rather than recognizing the assumptions in the CEAA about such things as the
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value of resource management and how to talk about it, harmonization treats
those assumptions as immediately applicable to Aboriginal communities in the
Mackenzie Valley. This approach is problematic because those assumptions were
forged through a long history of social and political development that is not
necessarily part of the northern Indigenous experience. Instead, assumptions that
resource management in the Mackenzie Valley can or should be consistent with
resource management in other jurisdictions should be reconsidered where
Aboriginal peoples' participation indicates otherwise.
The decision in De Beers provides an alternative approach to differentiated
interpretations based on a parliamentary intent to implement Aboriginal participation. In De Beers, Justice Charbonneau considered the potential application
of the CEAA. However, she rejected its application and allowed differentiated interpretations in that particular case based on a reading that Parliament
intended for diversity to be a product of participation. The court's reasoning on
each of the three issues presented in the case reflected a particular construction of
parliamentary intent: an intention that Aboriginal people would have meaningful input and an intention that the board's composition would allow it to balance
the various factors that go into decision making.
For example, based on the unique context of the statute's adoption, the
importance of the role given to the Review Board, and the importance placed on
public concern, the court rejected the submission that the meaning of the term
"consideration" in the CEAA is helpful to the interpretation of the MVRA. 2 1
The court further rejected the submission that the Review Board must consider
all factors in depth prior to ordering an environmental impact assessment.
Instead, Justice Charbonneau stated:
On the contrary, taking into consideration this Act as a whole and the unique context of its adoption, ... I am of the view that the powers given to the Review Board
should, wherever possible, be interpreted in a manner that gives the Review Board
the flexibility it needs to carry out its broad and complex mandate. 22
The court addressed the jurisdictional issues in a similar way. De Beers had
submitted that the Review Board prejudged the issues, fettered its own discretion, or took into account irrelevant factors that arose in community workshops
and hearings. The court noted that the Review Board's reports confirmed that
community members raised many issues at these hearings. However, the court

121. De Beers, supra note 2 at para 37.
122. Ibid at para 45.
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differentiated between the Review Board's reports on those submissions and the
Review Board's reasons, the latter of which is where the court argued the focus of
inquiry should be. Showing an understanding for how participation works, the
court noted:
[A]ny process that is designed, among other things, to engage the public and seek
input from various sources, has the potential of generating information and comments that are not relevant to the decision that has to be made. 123

The court characterized these hearings as meaningful participation from the
community and not as evidence of prejudgment. It therefore distinguished it
1 24
from the Review Board's findings.
Lastly, the court addressed De Beers's submission that the Review Board
erred in finding there to be a cause of significant public concern. While not
entirely clear from the written decision of the court, it seems that De Beers
had submitted that the Review Board had failed to evaluate whether the public
concern expressed in community workshops was justified. The court rejected
this interpretation. Instead, it argued that the unique context within which the
MVRAIA was enacted and its stated purpose showed an intention that the mere
existence of public concern is an important factor. The MVRMA does not require
the Review Board to be satisfied that concerns are insurmountable, unappeasable,
or justified. 2 '
According to Justice Charbonneau's construction, the Review Board does not
only implement Aboriginal participation through its final recommendations. The
Board also implements participation through its power over processes developed
pursuant to the MVVRA4. Where those processes reflect parliamentary intentions
vis-h-vis Aboriginal peoples, it is to be expected that they may be different than
those developed in other legislative schemes. Pivotal to the court's approach was
its acceptance of the M'RAJA as legislation that reflects the terms and goals of
the treaties and that reflects a different process for environmental assessment. This
approach is illustrated by Justice Charbonneau's construction of the intention of
Parliament to be the creation of a differentiated scheme for land and water use
management in the Mackenzie Valley. Through this approach, the court justified
the Board's interpretive authority as representative of that differentiation.
Notably, the decision did not cite Tungsten. However, De Beers can be
distinguished from Tungsten by its holding that where Aboriginal participation
123. Ibid at para 52.
124. Ibid at paras 55-56.
125. Ibid at paras 65-66.
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in co-management is relevant to an issue, harmonization is not appropriate. De
Beers exemplifies caution when inquiring whether a judicial interpretation of a
statute that is at odds with a board's interpretation ignores the impact of participation on statutory interpretation. Assumptions that the MVRMA can or
should be used in the same manner as other Canadian jurisdictions should be
tempered by a consideration of the role of Aboriginal peoples' participation in
its suggested use. A solitary focus on the intention of Parliament to have the same
meaning applied to both pieces of legislation permits the CEAA's meaning to
prevail. The effect may be to silence Aboriginal perspectives. Instead, De Beers
indicates another, more adaptive approach to interpretation that warrants further
consideration by the courts.
Ultimately, it should be expected that administrative boards constituted pursuant to treaties and expressly tasked with consideration ofAboriginal perspectives
on resource management may produce rules, decisions, and interpretations that
can be differentiated from other regimes. Seen in this light, the provisions of the
MVRMA that allow for participation also permit participation to impact its interpretation. Judicial review of a board's decisions without consideration of unique
perspectives contradicts the essence of the MVRMA as a legislative attempt to
institutionalize such perspectives through participation. That is, while harmonization and differentiation are both very much a part of the MVRMA, they must
both account for the incorporation of Aboriginal perspectives in order to be just.
Within this suggested approach, limiting the impact of Aboriginal perspectives
without recognizing it as such is problematic.

IV. CONCLUSION
Whether courts are cognizant of the impact of statutory interpretation on the
objectives of participation or not, judicial review of co-management boards will
only increase in the years to come. Courts will likely be asked to interpret the
meaning of new environmental assessment regimes in light of the CEAA. Functionally, that increase can be ascribed to the proliferation of contemporary treaties
that use participation as a procedural technique for achieving power sharing and
resource management. Yet, the increase can also be ascribed to the expectation,
or rather the hope, that treaties will bring certainty to long-standing disputes. It
is in this context that courts will grapple with the practicalities of implementing new administrative regimes premised on participation and thereby uphold
the broader constitutional objectives of contemporary treaties: the reconciliation
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians.
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What authority obligates courts to account for Aboriginal peoples' participation in judicial review of co-management board decisions? There are many ways
this question can be answered. For instance, analysis of a statute, its purpose, the
provisions that authorize participation, the treaties that gave rise to the statutes, the
standard of review, and their interpretation all provide insights into the requirements of law. In this article, I use this last suggested technique-that is, analysis
of how a co-management statute has been interpreted-to examine the ways in
which courts recognize Aboriginal peoples' participation as relevant or irrelevant
to statutory interpretation. I therefore set out to analyze whether harmonization
of a statute with its predecessor can undermine the objectives of Aboriginal
participation entrenched in a contemporary treaty.
An examination of the case law indicates that in reviewing issues of fact,
courts are deferential to the role of the boards in effecting the participatory goals
of the MVRMA and the treaties from which it arose. Moreover, the law to date
seems settled that determinations of law by a co-management board are to be
reviewed for their correctness and that boards are not due any special deference
in this regard. However, it remains unclear whether the objective of achieving
Aboriginal participation in resource management is relevant to the review of
board decisions pursuant to the MVRMA. I have established that the substantive objectives of co-management-more effective resource management and
power sharing-are not made explicit in the text of the MVRMA or the treaties.
Moreover, it is because the substantive goals of participation remain unexpressed
that it remains unclear to what extent these participatory initiatives may impact
the regulatory output of the boards. Essentially, the text remains ambiguous
about whether Aboriginal participation is only procedural, so that meeting the
requirements of the MVRAL are sufficient to establish participation, or whether
Aboriginal participation also creates the potential to alter the regulation in accordance with the substantive content of Indigenous traditions or perspectives
on resource management.
Despite political and historical evidence that Parliament intended to
create a new assessment regime and allow the participation of Aboriginal
peoples to affect decision making, the courts have found that Parliament
intended to harmonize the MVRMA and the CEAA. However, as discussed
here, harmonization is problematic where it reduces the impact of such participation to a mere procedural requirement of the statute. This discounting of
participation can undermine the analytical significance of institutions purposefully designed to integrate Aboriginal governments and their viewpoints in
decision making. While procedure is most certainly essential for achieving par-
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ticipation, the approach adopted in Tungsten and CanadianZinc illustrates the
effect of divorcing the procedural and substantive objectives of co-management.
Instead, building on the approach championed in De Beers, it is more appropriate to see the MVRMA as reflecting an expectation that participation can result
in interpretations that are distinguishable from those of built into the CEAA.
Ultimately, this conclusion means that courts are not precluded from drawing
on the CEAA to interpret the MVRMA, but they should be extremely cautious
of harmonization's impact on treaty origins and objectives.

